

Trends in Drug Resistant Organisms – Health Department's Role in Preventing and Responding

September 13, 2018

Joshua Clayton, PhD, MPH



Disclosure

I disclose that I have nothing to disclose.



Outline

- Renewed focus on antibiotic resistance
- Strategies to prevent and control
- What are multi-drug resistant organisms?
- Surveillance in the US and SD
- Response activities
- Resources

Renewed Focus

 Purpose to guide activities by the U.S. Government to address urgent and serious drug-resistant threats that affect people in the U.S. and around the world

Goals

- 1. Slow emergence of resistant bacteria
- 2. Strengthen One Health surveillance
- Advance diagnostic tests to identify resistant bacteria
- 4. Accelerate new antibiotic development
- 5. Improve international collaboration




MARCH 2015





CDC Focus


- Purpose to increase awareness of threat antibiotic resistance poses and encourage action
- >2 million individuals ill annually with 23,000 deaths
- \$20 billion in excess direct healthcare costs
- \$15 billion in lost productivity
- Categorized CDC concern levels
 - Concerning
 - Serious
 - Fluconazole-resistant Candida
 - Urgent
 - Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae





Four core actions to fight drug resistant infections

- Preventing infections, preventing the spread of resistance
- Track resistant bacteria
- Improve antibiotic prescribing/stewardship
- Develop new antibiotics and diagnostic tests



HAZARD LEVEL URGENT

These are high-consequence antibiotic-resistant threats because of significant risks identified across several criteria. These threats may not be currently widespread but have the potential to become so and require urgent public health attention to identify infections and to limit transmission.

Clostridium difficile (C. difficile), Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE), Drug-resistant Neisseria gonorrhoeae (cephalosporin resistance)

SERIOUS

These are significant antibiotic-resistant threats. For varying reasons (e.g., low or declining domestic incidence or reasonable availability of therapeutic agents), they are not considered urgent, but these threats will worsen and may become urgent without ongoing public health monitoring and prevention activities.

Multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter, Drug-resistant Campylobacter, Fluconazole-resistant Candida (a fungus), Extended spectrum β-lactamase producing Enterobacteriaceae (ESBLs), Vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE), Multidrug-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Drug-resistant Non-typhoidal Salmonella, Drug-resistant Salmonella Typhi, Drug-resistant Shigella, Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), Drug-resistant Streptococcus pneumonia, Drug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR and XDR)

CONCERNING

These are bacteria for which the threat of antibiotic resistance is low, and/ or there are multiple therapeutic options for resistant infections. These bacterial pathogens cause severe illness. Threats in this category require monitoring and in some cases rapid incident or outbreak response.

Vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (VRSA), Erythromycin-resistant Streptococcus Group A, Clindamycin-resistant Streptococcus Group B



Gaps in Knowledge

- Limited capacity to detect and respond
- No systemic international surveillance
- Antibiotic use in healthcare and agriculture not systematically collected
- Programs to improve antibiotic prescribing not widely used
- Limited availability of advanced molecular diagnostics for identification



Limited capacity to detect and respond

CDC's Antibiotic Resistance (AR) Solutions Initiative

Investing to Defend the United States against Antibiotic Resistance

CDC distributes funding to all 50 states to increase capacity for rapid detection and response to outbreaks and emerging resistance related to healthcare-associated infections, and foodborne bacteria.

www.cdc.gov/ARinvestments

South Dakota: \$384,498 \$353,712 for Rapid Detection and Response \$30,786 for Food Safety



No systemic international surveillance






- Escherichia coli
- Klebsiella pneumoniae
- Acinetobacter spp.
- Staphylococcus aureus
- Streptococcus pneumoniae
- Salmonella spp.
- Shigella spp.
- Neisseria gonorrhoeae



- blood
- urine
- stool
- genital swabs





Antibiotic use in healthcare and agriculture not systematically collected





Flow of AU Data: From Bedside to NHSN



eMAR/BCMA & ADT



- Monthly summary
- Location specific & **FacWideIN**
 - 89 antimicrobials
 - · Days present & admissions



Report in standard format





NHSN Servers

Pharmacists & Physicians compare and target education/interventions

Risk adjusted comparisons for specific locations, groupings of antimicrobials





Local access of data: NHSN web interface analysis, visualization and data sharing





Antibiotic use in healthcare and agriculture not systematically collected

Contains Nonbinding Recommendations

#209

#213

Guidance for Industry

The Judicious Use of Medically Important Antimicrobial Drugs in Food-Producing Animals

Submit comments on this guidance at any time. Submit written comments to the Division of Dockets Management (HFA-305), Food and Drug Administration, 5630 Fishers Lane, Room 1061, Rockville, MD 20852. Submit electronic comments on the guidance at http://www.regulations.gov. All written comments should be identified with the Docket No FDA-2010-D-0094

For further information regarding this document, contact William T. Flynn, Center for Veterinary Medicine (HFV-1), Food and Drug Administration, 7519 Standish Place, Rockville, MD 20855, 240-276-9084. E-mail: william.flynn@fda.hhs.gov.

Additional copies of this guidance document may be requested from the Communications Staff (HFV-12), Center for Veterinary Medicine, Food and Drug Administration, 7519 Standish Place, Rockville, MD 20855, and may be viewed on the Internet at either http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/default.htm or http://www.regulations.gov.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration Center for Veterinary Medicine April 13, 2012

Guidance for Industry

New Animal Drugs and New Animal Drug Combination Products Administered in or on Medicated Feed or Drinking Water of Food-Producing Animals: Recommendations for Drug Sponsors for Voluntarily Aligning Product Use Conditions with GFI #209

Submit comments on this guidance at any time. Submit written comments to the Division of Dockets Management (HFA-305), Food and Drug Administration, 5630 Fishers Lane, Rm. 1061, Rockville, MD 20852. Submit electronic comments to http://www.regulations.gov. All written comments should be identified with the Docket No. FDA-2011-D-0889.


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
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
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration Center for Veterinary Medicine December 2013



Programs to improve antibiotic prescribing not widely used








2014 2015



Limited availability of advanced molecular diagnostics for identification



SOUTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH



Multi-drug Resistant Organisms (MDROs)

- Carbapenemase-producing, Carbapenem resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CP-CRE)
- Candida auris



Enterobacteriaceae

- Normal human gut flora and environmental organisms
- More than 70 species
 - *Enterobacter* species
 - Escherichia coli
 - Klebsiella species
- Range of human infections: UTI, wound infections, pneumonia, bacteremia
- Important cause of healthcare-and community associated infections
- Some of the most common organisms encountered in clinical laboratories

Carbapenem Resistant Enterobacteriaceae

Enterobacteriaceae that are:

Resistant to one of the following carbapenems:

Doripenem

Ertapenem

Meropenem

Imipenem

OR

Documentation that the isolate possesses a Carbapenemase



Carbapenemases

Definition: are enzymes produced by bacteria that break down Carbapenems and make them ineffective. They are often contained on mobile genetic elements that facilitate transfer of resistance among Enterobacteriaceae and other gram-negative organisms.



Carbapenemase-producing Carbapenem Resistant *Enterobacteriaceae* (CP-CRE)

- CP-CRE is a subset of CRE
- Ability to spread rapidly by transfer of Carbapenemaseencoding plasmid
- Resistance mechanisms include:
 - KPC: Klebsiella pneumoniae Carbapenemase
 - NDM: New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase
 - OXA-48: oxacillinase-48
 - VIM: Verona integron-encoded metallo-β-lactamase
 - IMP: imipenemase






Surveillance for CP-CRE

KPC Detected in all 50 States


Patients with KPC-producing *Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae* (CRE) reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as of December 2017, by state





NDM Detected in all 34 States (N=379)

Patients with NDM-producing *Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae* (CRE) reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as of December 2017, by state






OXA-48 Detected in all 27 States (N=146)

Patients with OXA-48-Type-producing *Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae* (CRE) reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as of December 2017, by state

OXA-48 enzyme

None

Reported






IMP Detected in all 13 States (N=36)

Patients with IMP-producing *Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae* (CRE) reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as of December 2017, by state

IMP enzyme

None

Reported






VIM Detected in all 11 States (N=57)

Patients with VIM-producing *Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae* (CRE) reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as of December 2017, by state







CRE Epidemiology in SD



Reportable Diseases - South Dakota

+Category I diseases: Report <u>immediately</u> on suspicion of disease

Category II diseases: Report within 3 days

★ Send isolate to South Dakota Public Health Laboratory

Effective 1 January 2017

+Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis ★)

Anaplasmosis (Anaplasma phagocytophilum)
Arboviral encephalitis, meningitis and
infection (West Nile, Zika, St. Louis, Eastern
equine, Western equine, Chikungunya, California,
Japanese, Powassan, LaCrosse, Colorado tick fever)

Babesiosis (Babesia spp)

- +Botulism (Clostridium botulinum)
- +Brucellosis (Brucella spp★)

Campylobacteriosis (Campylobacter spp)

Carbon monoxide poisoning

Chancroid (Haemophilus ducreyi)

Chicken pox / Varicella (Herpesvirus)

Chlamydia infections (Chlamydia trachomatis)

Cholera (Vibrio cholerae)

Coccidioidomycosis (Coccidioides spp)

 Coronavirus respiratory syndromes, such as MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome) and SARS (Severe acute respiratory syndrome)

Cryptosporidiosis (Cryptosporidium spp)

Cyclosporiasis (Cyclospora cayetanensis)

Dengue viral infection (Flavivirus)

+Diphtheria (Corynebacterium diphtheriae★)

Drug resistant organisms:

- Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE)
- Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), invasive
- Vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (VRSA)★
- +E. coli, shiga toxin-producing

(Escherichia coli ★), includes E. coli O157:H7, O26, O111, O103 and others

Ehrlichiosis (Ehrlichia spp)

Giardiasis (Giardia lamblia / intestinalis)

Gonorrhea (Neisseria gonorrhoeae)

Haemophilus influenzae★, invasive disease

Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome or infection

Hemolytic uremic syndrome

Hepatitis, viral, acute A, B and C; chronic B and C; and perinatal B

Human immunodeficiency virus

(HIV) infection, also including:

- Stage III, Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, (AIDS)
- CD4 counts in HIV infected persons
- HIV viral loads, and
- pregnancy in HIV infected females

+Influenza, novel strains ★

Influenza: including hospitalizations, deaths, lab confirmed cases (culture, DFA, PCR), weekly aggregate totals of rapid antigen positive (A and B) and total tested

Lead, elevated blood levels

Legionellosis (Legionella spp)

Leprosy / Hansen's disease (Mycobacterium leprae)

Leptospirosis (Leptospira)

Listeriosis (Listeria monocytogenes★)

Lyme disease (Borrelia burgdorferi)

Malaria (Plasmodium spp)

- +Measles / Rubeola (Paramyxovirus)
- +Meningococcal disease, invasive

(Neisseria meningitidis★)

Mumps (Paramyxovirus)

Pertussis / Whooping cough (Bordetella pertussis)

Pesticide-related illness and injury, acute

- +Plague (Yersinia pestis★)
- +Poliomyelitis, paralytic and nonparalytic (Poliovirus)

Psittacosis (Chlamydophila psittaci)

Q fever (Coxiella burnetii)

- +Rabies, human and animal (Rhabdovirus)
- +Rubella and congenital rubella syndrome (Togavirus)

Salmonellosis (Salmonella spp★)

Shigellosis (Shigella spp★)
Silicosis

+Smallpox (Variola★)

Spotted fever rickettsiosis (Rickettsia spp)

Streptococcus pneumoniae, invasive

Syphilis (Treponema pallidum) including primary, secondary, latent, early latent, late latent, neurosyphilis, late non-neurological, stillbirth, and congenital

Tetanus (Clostridium tetani)

Toxic shock syndrome (Streptococcal and non-Streptococcal)

Transmissible spongiform

encephalopathies, such as Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

Trichinosis (Trichinella spiralis)

+Tuberculosis, active disease (Mycobacterium tuberculosis★ or Mycobacterium bovis★)

Tuberculosis, latent infection (only in certain high risk persons: foreign-born <5 yrs in US, close contacts, diabetes, renal dialysis, children <5 yrs, and certain medical conditions)

+Tularemia (Francisella tularensis★)

Typhoid (Salmonella typhi★)
Vaccine Adverse Events

+Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers (Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever virus, Ebola virus, Lassa virus, Lujo virus, Marburg virus, New World Arenavirus – Guanarito virus, Junin virus,

Machupo virus, Sabia virus)

Vibriosis (Vibrionaceae)
+Yellow fever (Flavivirus)

+Outbreaks of:

- +Acute upper respiratory illness
- +Diarrheal disease
- +Foodborne disease
- +Healthcare-associated infections
- +Illnesses in child care setting
- +Rash illness
- +Waterborne disease


+Syndromes suggestive of bioterrorism and other public health threats

+Unexplained illnesses or **deaths** in human or animal


How to Report CRE in SD

- CRE became reportable in 2013
- Report CRE via:
 - Secure website: http://sd.gov/diseasereport
 - Telephone: 605-773-3737 or 800-592-1861
 - Fax: 605-773-5509
 - Mail or courier, 615 East 4th Street
 Pierre, SD 57501







CRE (Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae) Cases Reported, South Dakota 2016 (n = 58) Infections



CRE (Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae) Cases Reported, South Dakota 2017 (n = 64)




Age of CRE Cases, 2017






Specimen Source, 2017






Organism Identified, 2017





Sex, 2017

67% Female; 33% Male






Carbapenemase Production, 2017

100% KPC mechanism

NO 39
YES 20
UNKNOWN 5





First NDM CP-CRE Detection in 2018

- Patient had outpatient visit on April 25
- Outpatient procedure for cystoscopy on May 1
- Presented to emergency dept. on May 2
- Admitted directly to ICU
- SD Public Health Lab resulted NDM (+) E. coli on May 4
 - Urine culture (OP1)
 - Urine culture (OP2)
 - Blood culture (ED)
- SD-DOH notified on May 4
- Patient placed in contact precautions same day
- SD-DOH consulted with CDC and admitting hospital






SD-DOH Response Capacity

SDPHL Detection of Carbapenemases

- Phenotypic:
 - Modified Hodge Test (MHT) - discontinuing
 - Modified Carbapenem Inactivation Method (mCIM) - - preferred method
- Molecular:
 - Cepheid Xpert Carba-R




mCIM



Cepheid



SDPHL CRE Laboratory Testing Flowchart




Phenotypic Carbapenemase Testing

- Modified Carbapenemase Inactivation Method (mCIM)
 - Phenotypic screening procedure for the detection of carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) and P. aeruginosa (CPPA)
 - Detects known and previously unidentified carbapenemase producing enzymes
 - Positive mCIM reflexed to molecular methods to determine gene variant



Overview of mCIM

The principle of the method is based on the ability of carbapenemase producing bacteria to inactivate carbapenem antibiotics



Carbapenemase-Producing Negative (zone of growth inhibition) Carbapenemase-Producing Positive (no zone of growth inhibition)

CLSI AST Subcommittee Meeting. January 16, 2017. Tempe, AZ.

Fermenter: Enterobacteriaceae Nonfermenter: P. aeruginosa

Molecular Detection of Carbapenemases

- Cepheid Gene Xpert Carba-R
 - RT-PCR
 - Detects carbapenemase producing enzymes: KPC, NDM, VIM, IMP, OXA-48 like
 - Performed on:
 - mCIM positive isolates
 - Rectal swabs for screening and outbreak testing





HAI Program

- Technical Assistance Non Regulatory
- Focus on Infection control and Prevention
 - Ebola Hospital Assessments
 - Designated Ebola Assessment Facility
 - Infection Control Assessments LTC
 - Improved Competency
 - Training and Certification in IC
- Reduction of HAIs in Healthcare Settings
- Detect, Prevent, and Contain
 - NHSN Data Surveillance, Reporting and Validation
- HAI and MDRO/XDRO Outbreak Response
- Antimicrobial Stewardship




SD-DOH HAI Program Response and Outbreak Consultation

- Data collection and surveillance
- Identify at-risk individual(s)/population(s)
- Perform focused surveillance if appropriate
- Implement appropriate infection control precautions
- Continue surveillance and/or intervention until resolution of outbreak



SD-DOH Uses CDC Guidelines

Interim Guidance for a Public Health Response to Contain Novel or Targeted Multidrug-resistant Organisms (MDROs)



Goals:

- Identify if transmission /dissemination occurring
- Identifying affected patients
- Ensuring appropriate control measures are promptly initiated/implemented to contain spread
- Characterize organism/mechanism to guide response action, patient management, and responses

https://www.cdc.gov/hai/containment/guidelines.html





Tiered Response

Tier 1: Novel/Rare (VRSA)

Tier 2: Uncommon (NDM)

Tier 3: Common (KPC)



Tier 2 Organism

- Notification: caregiver, healthcare staff, health dept.
- Implement appropriate infection control measures
- Inform patient and family
- Consider index patient screening cultures
 - Impact patient care
 - >1 month has passed
- Conduct healthcare investigation: review interactions
- Conduct contact investigation
- Environmental cultures generally not recommended
- Ensure adherence to infection control




Tier 2 Organism Contact Investigation

- Focus on previous month unless expanded
- Culture epi-linked patients
 - Roommates (even if discharged)
 - High risk contacts (if patient not on contact precautions entire stay)
 - Overlap with patient ≥3 days, AND
 - Risk factor for MDRO
 - Bedbound
 - Require higher level of care
 - Receiving antibiotics
 - Mechanically ventilated
 - Consider Point Prevalence Survey of unit

Tier 2 Organism Contact Investigation (2)

- Wider surveys warranted if:
 - Suspicion of ongoing risk
 - Initial screen of high-risk patients identifies spread
- Generally not needed to screen:
 - Healthcare providers
 - Household contacts
- Initiate surveillance in laboratory for similar organisms or resistance patterns
 - Prospective and retrospective







Implementation and Adherence to Infection Control Measures

- Educate and inform appropriate healthcare personnel and visitors
- Ensure adequate supplies available to implement precautions
- Monitor adherence to infection control practices (index patient)
- Notification of index patient results for health care continuity
- Inter-facility transfer form used during transfer









Facility Guidance for Control of Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE)

November 2015 Update - CRE Toolkit





Content of CDC Facility Guidance

- 1. Hand hygiene
- 2. Contact Precautions
- 3. HCP education
- 4. Minimizing device use
- 5. Laboratory notification
- 6. Communication
- 7. Antimicrobial Stewardship
- 8. Environmental cleaning
- 9. Cohorting
- 10. Supplemental
 - Screening
 - CHG bathing



Date:		
Unit:		
Room Number:		

CDC Environmental Checklist for Monitoring Terminal Cleaning

1

Evaluate the following priority sites for each patient room:

Initials of ES staff (optional):2

High-touch Room Surfaces ³	Cleaned	Not Cleaned	Not Present in Room
Bed rails / controls			
Tray table			
IV pole (grab area)			
Call box / button			
Telephone			
Bedside table handle			
Chair			
Room sink			
Room light switch			
Room inner door knob			
Bathroom inner door knob / plate			
Bathroom light switch			
Bathroom handrails by toilet			
Bathroom sink			
Toilet seat			
Toilet flush handle			
Toilet bedpan cleaner			

Evaluate the following additional sites if these equipment are present in the room:

High-touch Room Surfaces	Cleaned	Not Cleaned	Not Present in Room
IV pump control			
Multi-module monitor controls			
Multi-module monitor touch screen			
Multi-module monitor cables			
Ventilator control panel			

Mar	k the	monitoring method	used:
_	ъ.		

Direct observation	Fluorescent gel	
Swab cultures	ATP system	Agar slide cultures



http://www.cdc.gov/HAI/toolkit s/Environmental-Cleaning-Checklist-10-6-2010.pdf



¹Selection of detergents and disinfectants should be according to institutional policies and procedures ²Hospitals may choose to include identifiers of individual environmental services staff for feedback purposes. $^3\mathrm{Sites}$ most frequently contaminated and touched by patients and/or healthcare workers

Steps Clinicians Should Take

- Know if patients under your care are at risk of CRE
 - Facility CRE infection rates?
 - Patient received medical care internationally?
 - Overnights stay in healthcare facility outside U.S. in prior 6 months?
- Apply contact precautions for patients current or previously colonized or infected with CRE
 - Dedicated room, equipment and staff, if possible
- Wear a gown and gloves during patient care
- Perform hand hygiene before and after contact with patient or their environment

Steps Clinicians Should Take (2)

- Complete inter-facility transfer form
- Ensure labs immediately alert clinical and infection prevention staff when CRE identified
- Prescribe and use antibiotics wisely
- Discontinue devices once no longer necessary



Inter-facility Transfer Form

pricer-raci	ility Infectior	n Control T	ransfer For	m
This form must be filled out for transf <u>Please attach copi</u> Sending Healthcare Facility:				
Patient/Resident Last Name	First	Name	Date of Birth	Medical Record No.
Name/Address of Sending Facility		Sending	Unit	Sending Facility Phone
Sending Facility Contacts	Name		Phone	E-mail
Case Manager/Admin/SW				
Infection Prevention				
			☐ Airborne	
Does patient currently have an infection, culture of a multidrug-resistant organism epidemiological significance?	colonization OR a hist (MORO) or other org	tory of positive	Colonization or history Check if YES	Active infection on Treatment Check if YES
Does patient currently have an infection, culture of a multidrug-resistant organism epidemiological significance?	colonization OR a hist (MORO) or other org	tory of positive	Colonization or history	Active infection on Treatment
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Steps Facilities Should Take

- Require and strictly enforce CDC guidance for CRE detection, prevention, tracking, and reporting
- Make sure their lab can accurately identify CRE
- Promote antimicrobial stewardship
- Recognize resistant organisms as important to patient safety
- Understand their prevalence in the facility and region
- Identify colonized and infected patients in the facility and ensure precautions are implemented
- Require Inter-facility Transfer Form for patients
- Participate in Regional and facility-based efforts to stop transmission of these organisms
- Notify health department of outbreaks



Steps Patients Should Take

- Tell your doctor if hospitalized in another country
- Take antibiotics only as prescribed
- Expect all doctors, nurses, and care providers to wash their hands before touching you
- Clean your own hands often
 - Before preparing or eating food
 - Before touching your eyes, nose, or mouth
 - Before and after changing dressings/bandages or handling medical devices
 - After using bathroom
 - After blowing nose, coughing, or sneezing
- Ask questions and participate in your care



Steps Health Department Should Take

- Conduct surveillance to determine incidence or prevalence of CRE
- Increase awareness of CRE prevalence among healthcare facilities
- Provide a standardized Inter-facility Transfer Form
- Consider adding CRE as a reportable condition
- Include a range of facility types when developing regional prevention projects
- Be a resource for healthcare facilities on appropriate infection prevention measures and antimicrobial stewardship



Summary

- There are bad bugs out there
- You are not alone in the fight
- Let us know what we can do to further support you



Thank You!



Joshua Clayton, PhD, MPH

State Epidemiologist

SD Department of Health

615 East 4th Street

Pierre, SD 57501

605-773-3737

Joshua.Clayton@state.sd.us

https://doh.sd.gov/diseases/hai/

